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NOMENCLATURE
mi The number of network motifs in which agent i 
participates.
ai The maximum number of attack attempts agent i 
can conduct.
ui The offensive capability of an agent i.
Pij
D The probability of successful detection.
Pij
C The probability of successful communication.
Pij
H The probability of successful attack.
Pij
S The probability of target information acquisition for 
a specific attack opportunity.
ei The expected number of attack opportunities that an 
agent i can actually materialize.
δij Value of attack opportunity j that an agent i holds.
Nc The number of enemy casualty.
1. INTRODUCTION
Commanders make strategic and tactical decisions such as 
weapon acquisition and new doctrines to enhance their force’s 
combat capabilities. To make optimal decisions, they must 
accurately grasp the current capabilities of their troops and 
those of the enemy in various combat environments. To this 
end, many studies in the military domain have sought to develop 
methods for accurately measuring combat effectiveness1-7.
Combat effectiveness can be conceptually defined as the 
overall capability of a military force to produce the desired 
outcome from a combat against an enemy force. In the classic 
Lanchester’s model for a firearm engagement between two 
opposing forces, combat effectiveness of each force is directly 
proportional to their offensive firepower and initial size2. The 
offensive firepower is incorporated by a coefficient of attrition 
rate that represents the number of enemy (friendly, respectively) 
soldiers each soldier in a friendly (enemy, respectively) force 
can incapacitate per unit time. While the firepower is certainly 
an important contributor to combat effectiveness, firepower 
alone does not fully represent how effective a military force 
will be in a combat8. Combat effectiveness depends on many 
factors other than the fire power of a force, e.g., doctrines and 
tactics, logistics, information, knowledge, etc.
Measuring combat effectiveness is a challenging task 
since it is a complex function of many factors of military 
forces. Hayward presented a conceptual framework to measure 
combat effectiveness as follows1:
Combat effectiveness of a force   
 = probability of success in combat, P(S) 
= 1 1 1 1( , , : , , : , , , , , )n n m rf x x y y e e m m    ,              
(1) 
where xn (yn) denotes the n
th capability of a force, en is an 
environmental parameter, and mr is a mission parameter. It 
is noteworthy that this conceptual definition emphasizes that 
combat effectiveness is defined in a multi-dimensional space 
in three categories: capabilities, environment, and mission.
It is particularly difficult to measure combat effectiveness 
when the modern paradigm for conducting warfare is network 
centric warfare (NCW). A key aspect of NCW is to enhance 
information sharing among combatants and commanders. 
Sharing information is expected to create positive effects, 
including improved situational awareness, self-synchronization, 
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faster speed of command, increased force lethality3-5,9,10. In an 
NCW environment, the overall capability of a military force is 
more than a simple sum of capabilities of individual components 
and abilities of forces. For example, to assess the capability 
of an autonomous air defence system, one must account for 
many other factors than the shooter components11. An air 
defence system must first detect the emergence of air threats. 
Low-altitude radars with sophisticated data fusion technologies 
are needed to detect the threats and create accurate information. 
This information needs to be disseminated to relevant decision 
makers and actors without delay so that action plans are 
formulated quickly. Optimal target allocation by command and 
control system also contributes to successful air defence by 
effectively responding to the threat. All of these factors–missiles, 
radar, C2, communications, etc. must be accounted for to 
properly assess the overall capability of an air defence system.
There have been research efforts to develop metrics for 
NCW combat effectiveness, primarily from the communication 
network perspective. Many of these studies attempt to measure 
the benefits from NCW capability, where they use network 
representation of forces with particular emphasis on information 
flow aspects3,4,12,13. Ling3, et al. defines network tempo as the 
product of network reach and richness. Network reach is related 
to the information flow on a network, and richness represents 
the ability of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) assets to transform information into knowledge. They 
use the network tempo to define an upper-bound for Boyd’s 
cycle observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) time. Janssen and 
Monsuur12 proposes a network performance metric to capture 
the level of situational awareness in a combat network. Perry4, 
et al. defines network plecticity to quantify the benefit and cost 
of information flow, and measures the impact of accuracy and 
precision of information on collaboration between combatants 
in a network. Jung13, et al. develop the concept of network power 
to incorporate synergetic effects brought by synchronization 
and shared information flow. While various metrics developed 
in the previous research measure the benefits in some aspects 
caused by NCW capability, it is not clear how such benefits 
translate to the overall combat effectiveness. They fail to 
consider how the partial effectiveness is combined with the 
overall combat effectiveness. For example, the upper-bound 
of OODA time can provide insight on the speed at which a 
networked force makes decisions and executes the decisions, 
but that is a part, not the entire whole of the overall combat 
effectiveness3.
One alternative to measure combat effectiveness is by 
directly observing outcomes of combats. Over recent decades, 
many researchers have developed combat simulations that can 
be used to generate outcomes of virtual combats (e.g., MANA, 
WISDOM II). A combat simulation model can incorporate 
features of real-world combat environments. There are several 
combat simulation models that capture various NCW features 
by including command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
components6,7,14. One can assess the combat effectiveness of a 
designated force by observing outcomes from virtual combats.
Developing an analytic metric for combat effectiveness 
is another alternative. Simulations can generate empirical 
data from various designed situations; however it is difficult 
to develop logical insight and principles that can explain the 
appearance of the data. Often, a complex simulation model 
works as a black-box, making it quite difficult to establish 
connections between inputs and outputs by concise logical 
explanation. On the other hand, an analytic metric defines a 
functional relation between control variables and combat 
outputs. Therefore, an analytic metric can provide a transparent 
understanding as to how changes in control variables are related 
to outputs by functional relation.
In this paper, our goal is to develop a metric to 
quantitatively measure combat effectiveness of a military 
force in an engagement-level combat environment. Our metric 
is designed to capture links between firepower and NCW 
capability, especially information sharing among combat 
participants. To develop the metric, we construct a network 
model that represents interactions among combat participants 
in combat environments.
2. NETWORKED COMBAT MODEL
2.1 Network Representation of Combat Situation
Measuring combat effectiveness requires an underlying 
combat model that captures various elements of a combat 
environment including firepower of forces and the information 
flow. Along this line, cares provides a network representation 
for a combat model, where a combat environment is represented 
by a network of distributed forces15. Nodes in a network denote 
entities participating in a combat. Specifically, the nodes are 
classified to sensors, deciders, influencers, and targets. Directed 
arcs between the nodes represent physical or informational 
interactions between the entities. 
While the basic network model by Cares is a concise 
representation of a combat, there are much richer interactions 
that take place in a combat situation. A meta-matrix is a 
conceptual modeling technique to model relationships among 
various agents in heterogeneous domains16. It has been used 
to model terrorist networks to capture complex dynamics of 
terrorist activity development17. A meta-matrix representation 
recognizes that events like terrorist activities evolve through 
interactions encompassing many different domains. In the 
present study, our meta-matrix uses five entities: friendly force 
agents, hostile agents, task, information, and location. 
We then adopt the basic network representation framework 
of Cares along with a meta-matrix representation to model 
a combat environment. This leads us to a graphical network 
model for a combat environment. A combat model based on 
the meta-matrix can have heterogeneous nodes in different 
domains, and it incorporates various interaction networks 
specified in the meta-matrix. This representation allows us to 
capture diverse aspects of a combat environment, for example, 
geospatial deployment of forces, information sharing by 
networking, and task allocation in a combat operation. As an 
example, an event of ‘a friendly agent’s attacking an enemy 
agent’ can be graphically represented as shown in Fig. 1. An 
attack is conducted by an agent (A). A task of incapacitating 
enemy agent B (m) is assigned to friendly agent A (j). 
Friendly agent A is also assigned a task of detecting enemy 
agents (j’, m’). It possesses information about the target 
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enemy agent B (k, l). Enemy agent B occupies a location 
(o), and a friendly agent A has a capability to influence entities 
in that location (e.g., the location is within its fire range). fig. 
1, thus, represents a situation for a possible attack by friendly 
agent A on enemy agent B.
presence of enemy agent B by itself (e.g., due to a lack of 
detection capability), as depicted by the lack of connection to 
‘Task (detect)’. The other friendly agent A2 has the capability 
to detect entities in the location where enemy agent B resides 
(n’), and acquires information on enemy agent B(k,l). 
Agent A2 can detect B, but it is not capable of incapacitating B. 
Information on enemy agent B is passed to A1 from A2 (p), and 
it allows A1 to exert force on enemy agent B (j,m,n). This is 
a situation where an attack on enemy agent B is made possible 
through collaboration between A1 and A2.
A combat environment with a complicated structure of 
agents, capabilities, tasks, and locations will create a large 
network with a web of edges connecting nodes. Even for such 
a complicated combat environment network, a basic unit for 
an attack opportunity structure is either an isolated attack or 
a coordinated attack. Thus, we use the two types of attack 
opportunity structures shown in Fig. 1 and 2 as a basic unit 
to assess the total number of attack opportunities of a friendly 
force in a direct fire engagement. 
As the first step toward developing a measure for combat 
effectiveness using a network model, this paper works with a 
simplified model. figure 3 is reduced from figs. 1 and 2 by 
extracting only communication and influence networks.
To summarize this section, we argue that combat 
effectiveness of a force under a direct fire engagement can 
be reasonably assessed by the number of attack opportunities 
that it has under a current combat environment. In order to 
obtain the number of attack opportunities, we model a combat 
environment by a heterogeneous network. Two basic unit 
structures of attack opportunity – isolated and networked – are 
identified based on the network representation. We measure 
their prevalence in a combat network to assess the number of 
attack opportunity of a force. 
2.2 Models of Attack Opportunity
When two opposing forces are engaging in a combat, 
one of the immediate measures of success for a friendly force 
is the size of enemy casualties. Enemy casualties are in turn 
related to the strength of friendly force’s offensive actions. 
Strength of offensive actions may be represented by the size 
of shooter elements or the number of attempts of attack. For 
example, a coefficient of attrition rate in Lanchester’s model 
is proportional to the number of attempts of attack assuming 
a direct-fire engagement between homogeneous combatants8. 
Thus, in a narrow context of a direct fire engagement, a possible 
measure of combat effectiveness of a force is its capability of 
creating a large number of opportunities and options for attack 
attempts.
The number of opportunities for attack attempts created 
by a force is a function of its intrinsic capabilities, location 
properties, a task assignment structure, and capabilities of an 
enemy force. An attack opportunity may be created by a single 
agent (Fig. 1), or by collaboration and coordination between 
two or more agents. Figure 2 is an example of a network 
representation of an attack opportunity created by two friendly 
agents A1 and A2. In this study, we refer to an attack depicted 
in Fig. 1 as an isolated attack, and the mode in Fig. 2 as a 
networked attack.
Figure 2 depicts a situation where A1 cannot detect the 
Figure 1. Network representation of an engagement between 
two opposing agents.
Figure 2.  Networked attack opportunity.
Figure 3.  Simplified structures for two types of attack opportunity. 
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3. METRIC DEVELOPMENT
The two types of attack opportunity structures shown 
in Fig. 3 are used as a basic unit to assess the total number 
of opportunities a friendly force possesses in a direct fire 
engagement. In other words, we use the two structures as a 
network motif, a special pattern found in a network18, and 
assess the prevalence of these motifs in a combat environment 
network as a measure of the number of opportunities for attack 
attempts. 
Consider a direct fire engagement where a friendly force 
has N agents, indexed by i. Define a set of friendly agents F 
= {1, 2, …,N}. Let mi denote the number of network motifs 
in which agent i participates. Then, the simplest scheme to 
measure the prevalence of network motifs – thereby attack 





= ∑                                                                    (2) 
 
M1 in Eqn. (2) ignores the fact that the number of attack attempts 
is related to the amount of resource (e.g., ammunitions). This 
leads to a possible over- or under-estimation of the attack 
attempts. Let ai denote the maximum number of attack attempts 
agent i can materialize in a single round of fire exchange. When 
ai<mi, only ai attack attempts can be made at maximum, and 
(mi–ai) opportunities will not be materialized. Hence, M1would 
overestimatethe attack attempts by agent i. On the other hand, 
when ai>mi, M1 may lead to an under-estimation of the attack 
attempts: agent i can utilize all mi attack opportunities, and still 
have (ai–mi) resources so that it can execute more attacks than 
mi. 
Before moving forward to present modified metrics, it 
is worthwhile to revisit Eqn. (2) and give a slightly different 
interpretation. Recall that what we ultimately attempt to 
measure by Eqn. (2) is the overall combat effectiveness by a 
friendly force. Then, Eqn. (2) can be considered as the sum 
of offensive capability of the agents in the force. By letting ui 






= ∑                           (3)
i iu m=
In other words, Eqn. (2) is a special case of Eqn. (3) in 
which the offensive capability of an individual agent is defined 
to be equal to the number of motifs (i.e., basic attack structures) 
it possesses. 
Now, let us consider an alternative definition of offensive 
capability ui that takes into account the effect of the maximum 
number of attack attempts, ai
min( , )i i iu m a=                                         (4)
Substituting ui in Eqn. (3) with Eqn. (4), we have a new 
metric which we label as M2. Equation (4) states that the 
offensive capability of a combat agent i is limited either by 
the number of attack opportunities it has or by the amount of 
attack resource it can consume. This definition is based on the 
following rationale. First, the offensive capability of a combat 
agent i cannot be greater than the amount of attack resources 
it has. Secondly, the maximum number of enemies an agent 
can incapacitate cannot be greater than the number of attack 
opportunities it possesses. 
While ui in Eqn. (4) makes an intuitive appeal, we may 
refine the metric further by recognizing some of the attack 
opportunities may not be available to the agent. Recall that an 
isolated attack structure has two arcs connecting an agent to its 
potential target: one for detect, and the other for fire (fig. 3). 
For this particular attack opportunity to be materialized by 
the agent, a successful detection of the target should precede 
actual firing. Likewise, for a networked attack, detection of 
a target by agent A2 and transferring the information from A2 
to A1 must succeed before A2 can attack the target. Let j be 
the index for attack opportunity structures for agent i, and let 
Pij
D and Pij
C denote the probability of successful detection and 
communication respectively for agent i’s attack opportunity j, 
as shown in Fig. 3. Then, the probability of target information 
acquisition for attack opportunity j, denoted as Pij
S, is Pij
D, for 
an isolated attack and Pij
DPij
C for a networked attack (assuming 
independence between detection and communication). 
Then we define the effective attack opportunities ei for 








= ∑                            (5)
S D
ij ijP P=      for an isolated attack
S D C
ij ij ijP P P=      for a networked attack.
ei represents the expected number of attack opportunities that 
an agent i can actually materialize (i.e. fire), and it is evident 
that ei≤mi for all i. Then, eqn. (4) is modified to
min( , )i i iu e a=                           (6)
Yet another refinement can be considered by recognizing 
that each attack opportunity j presents different value, δij. 
Probability of success for a single fire, Pij
H is a reasonable 
candidate to represent a value of an attack opportunity j. For 
example, an attack opportunity j with a very high-precision 
weapon is likely to pose much higher threat to the enemy than 
j’ with a low-precision weapon, hence 'ij ijδ ≥ δ . Then, average 
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= δ∑                           (8)
where ui and δi are given by Eqns. (6) and (7), respectively.
Table 1 summarizes the definition of each metric along 
with their key features.
4. VALIDATION OF THE PROPOSED METRIC
Simulation experiments and their results were examined 
for the validity of the proposed metrics M1, M2, and M3 in terms 
of its usefulness as a metric for combat effectiveness. Authors 
used simulation experiments to verify a positive correlation 
between the value of the proposed metrics and the number of 
enemy casualties from simulated direct fire engagements.
Lee & Lee: NeTWOrk-BASeD MeTrIC fOr MeASurINg COMBAT effeCTIveNeSS 
119
4.1 Simulation Model and Experimental Design
Our simulation model for a direct fire engagement is 
based on an agent-based modeling framework. It represents 
a relatively simple, ‘Lanchester-like’ model19, where two 
opposing forces enter a direct fire engagement with the 
same number of combatants (50 each). We use commercial 
simulation software AnyLogicTM(version 6.6) to develop a 
simulation model and conduct the experiments.
Figure 4 is a formalism for modeling and analysis of 
discrete event systems (DEVS) atomic model of an individual 
combat agent, which represent their state transitions. An agent 
is initially in ALIVE state, and its state sequentially changes 
to DETECT, COMM, ATTACK, and MOVE by the internal 
transitions (δint), which are triggered by the elapsed times in 
lower parts of the circles in Fig. 4. In DETECT state, an agent 
acquires information about nearby enemies. In COMM state, it 
transmits (or receives) the acquired information to (or from) its 
neighbouring friendly agents. Using the shared information, it 
fires on its target enemy (or enemies) in ATTACk state. After 
consuming all their ammunitions, it moves to a designated 
location in MOVE state. In any of the states, if an agent receives 
an external input message DAMAge – i.e., it gets shot by an 
enemy agent, its state changes to DESTROYED state. Agents 
in DESTROYED state become dormant and do not participate 
in combat any more. 
Combat in simulation progresses by the internal state 
transition of agents and the exchanges of messages. At the 
beginning of a combat, agents of a friendly force and enemy 
force are randomly distributed across an 800 m x 800 m 
battlefield. All agents have range profiles for their detection 
and attack function as specified in Table 2. Current locations 
of agents, distances to other agents, and agent’s range profiles, 
and attributes – the amount of ammunitions and probabilities 
of successful behaviours (Pij
D, Pij
C, Pij
H ) – produce combat 
results (i.e. the number of enemy and friendly casualties).
When the engagement commences, agents in friendly 
and enemy forces conduct their functions in turn, and record 
state transitions as a result. Agents can detect, communicate, 
attack or move in response to other agents around them and 
their current states. These actions initiate message exchanges 
among agents. Combat is terminated when no agent is alive on 
either side of the forces or when no further action is possible 
by any agent.
For each simulation run, since we cannot directly control 
the value of the developed metrics, we sample a value for the 
communication range from a uniform distribution U[0, 300]. 
In other words, each simulation instances has a different 
communication profile for combat agents. for simplicity, 
the success probabilities of each action arc of an agent are 
assumed to have a single value – that is, Pij
D = Pij
C = Pij
H = Pi 
for all  j. Total of 13 simulation instances are tested by varying 
Pi  and ai. 
At the beginning of a simulation run, the proposed metrics 
M1, M2, and M3 are computed, and a simulation run is executed 
for a single round of fire exchange. At the end of a round of 
fire exchange, the number of enemy casualty Nc is reported. 
To verify that the proposed metric is a meaningful indicator 
of combat outcome (i.e., number of casualty), we follow Perry 
and Moffat20 to examine correlation between the metrics and 
the number of enemy casualties, Nc. High correlation (> 0.7)
between the proposed metric and the number of casualty from 
simulation suggests the metric is an appropriate indicator. We 





































Count the sheer number •	
of attack opportunities
Simplest metric•	




Consider the effective number •	
of attack opportunities
Recognizes attack opportuni-•	
ties have different values
Table 1.  Definition of M1, M2 and M3
Figure 4.  DEVS atomic model representation of a combat agent 
in our simulation.
Type Detection range 
Attack
range Proportions (%)
A 280 20 20
B 250 50 10
C 50 250 40
D 20 280 30
Table 2. Types of combat agents in the simulation model
four types of combat agents are defined according to the 
range profile for the three functions – detect, communicate, 
and attack, and they are listed in Table 2. Type A and B have 
a long range detection but short-range attack. Type C and D 
have the opposite range profile with a short range detection 
and long-range attack. For communication, we assume that all 
four types of agents have the same capability, and so assigned 
a single value to all agents. Each side of the forces consists 
of all four types of agents with the same proportions. Table 2 
summarizes the agents’ characteristics. 
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replications. p-values of all correlation coefficients reported in 
this paper are <0.01. 
4.2 Experimental Results
Table 3 shows the results from the simulation instances 
where the amount of ammunition ai is varied while fixing Pi to 
1. This set of simulation instances examines the effect of the 
amount of ammunition on the degree of correlation between 
each metric and Nc.
becomes large, which leads to a lower correlation compared to 
when M2 is used for measuring Nc (Fig. 5(c)). On the other 
hand, for M2, ui=min(mi,ai) is bounded by ai when mi is large, and 
thus M2stops increasing at some point. This explains the higher 
correlation between M2 and the number of enemy casualty.
In the second set of simulation instances, Pi is varied and 
ai is set to 1. Table 4 shows the results for these instances 
When Pi is less than 1, M3 takes a different value from 
M2. This difference comes from two possible causes in the 
simulation: first, some of the attack opportunity structures 
are deemed unavailable due to a failure in detection or 
communication task. They are structurally linked to form an 
attack opportunity, but either the communication or detection 
fails and thereby it does not get materialized. Second, when 
both detection and communication are successfully carried 
out, it is still possible that an attack attempt does not lead to 
incapacitation of the target. M3 captures those probabilistic 
factors. The simulation model incorporates these probabilistic 
behaviour, and as such we expect M3 to show a higher 
correlation with the number of enemy casualty than M1 and M2. 
Since most combat simulation models includes probabilistic 
factors in some aspects, e.g., kill probability and probabilistic 
detection, accounting for probabilistic factors in the metric as 
in M3 is a logical treatment. 
The improved correlation from M3 is observed in the 
simulation results. Table 4 shows that in all but instance 7, M3 
gives a higher correlations of M1 and M2. Between M2 and M3, 
M3 outperforms M2 more when Pi becomes smaller, suggesting 
it is more relevant to use M3in those cases. There is one counter-
intuitive pattern observed in Table 4: M1 apparently shows a 
higher correlation with Nc as Pi decreases. Since M1 does not 
take into account probabilistic factors, this behaviour is due to 
the changes in Nc. In fact, Fig. 6(d) shows a much less-obvious 
No. Pi ai M1 M2 M3
1 1 1 0.7663 0.9562
same as M2
2 1 2 0.7067 0.9740
3 1 3 0.6192 0.9348
4 1 4 0.5754 0.8897
5 1 5 0.5429 0.8558
Table 3. Pearson correlation coefficient between M1, M2, M3 
and the number of enemy casualty Nc where Pi = 1, 
ai = {1,2,3,4,5}
In Table 3, entries < 0.7 are italicized to indicate they do not 
show strong correlation. Among the three metrics, the one with 
the highest correlation is indicated as bold. In these instances, 
M2 is same as M3 since ei in M3 equals mi and δi becomes 1. M2 
(and M3) shows a higher correlation than M1 in both Pearson and 
Spearman correlation coefficients. A closer examination on the 
experimental data shows that M1 increases in response to the 
level of communication range used (Fig. 5(a)). This is because 
longer communication range increases the number of agents 
communicating with agent i, thereby increasing total apparent 
attack opportunities mi. Meanwhile the number of enemy 
casualties Nc remains stable when the communication ranges 
Figure 5.  Scatter plots of (a) M1, (b) M2, and (c) Nc wrt communication range (plotted for instance 3).
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plateau behaviour than observed in Fig. 5(c). 
In the above 10 instances, all agents are assigned the same 
Pi and ai values. In instances 11-14, a random value is drawn 
from a uniform distribution for ai (instance 11 and 12) and Pi 
(instance 13 and 14) to introduce higher heterogeneity to the 
agents. With Pi less than 1 and ai greater than 1, these instances 
are the most general setting. Results from these instances are 
shown in Table 5 along with instance 10 as a reference. 
In instances 11 and 12, there is not much change from 
the result from instance 10. In instances 13 and 14, however, 
correlation coefficients by M1 and M2 drop significantly while 
M3 still yields similar value to instance 10. This suggests that 
M1 and M2, which do not take into account probabilistic factors, 
are not robust to variations in Pi. M3 outperforms the other two 
metrics particularly when Pi varies among the agents. 
Overall, the experimental results suggest that M3 is a 
reliable and appropriate metric to correlate with the number of 
enemy casualty in a direct fire engagement. It gives a correlation 
coefficient higher than 0.7 and the highest correlation coefficient 
in all but one instance. 
We conduct additional experiments for combats between 
two forces possessing asymmetric powers. The asymmetric 
powers mean that the number of ammunitions (ai), probabilities 
of successful behaviours (Pi), and communication range are 
differently assigned to each force. In this experiment, we set 
the parameters such that one force does not dominate the other: 
e.g., enemy force has higher ai and Pi while friendly force has 
longer communication range. Simulation runs are replicated 
five thousand times, and we observe combat results and the 
differences between the metric ∆( 3 3
Friendly EnemyM M= − ). ∆ 
indicates the advantages on attack opportunities the friendly 
force has over the enemy force. The experimental results show 
that when ∆> 0, the friendly force wins the combat for more 
than 50 per cent of the simulation, and when ∆< 0, it loses more 
than 50 per cent. Also, a larger ∆ results in the higher winning 
rate from the simulation runs. Similarly, we also test M2 and 
M1 to compute ∆, but it does not show such trend. These results 
demonstrate that M3 is a reasonable indicator for measuring 
combat effectiveness to determine superiority between two 
asymmetric forces.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
Measuring combat effectiveness is a challenging task 
since it is a complex function of many factors of military forces 
and combat environment. We argue that combat effectiveness 
of a force under a direct fire engagement can be reasonably 
Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficient between M1, M2, M3 
and the number of enemy casualty Nc where Pi = {1, 
0.875, 0.75, 0.625, 0.5}, ai = 1
No. Pi ai M1 M2 M3
6 1 3 0.6192 0.9348 0.9348
7 0.875 3 0.6621 0.9604 0.9576
8 0.75 3 0.7411 0.9734 0.9739
9 0.625 3 0.8089 0.9604 0.9704
10 0.5 3 0.8680 0.9158 0.9427
Figure 6.  Scatter plots of (a) M1, (b) M2,(c) M3, and (d) Ncwith respect to communication range (instance 10).
Table 5.  Pearson correlation coefficient between M1, M2, M3 
and the number of enemy casualty Nc where agents 
are assigned random values for Pi or ai
No. Pi ai M1 M2 M3
10 0.5 3 0.8680 0.9158 0.9427
11 0.5 U[2,4] 0.8621 0.9175 0.9436
12 0.5 U[1,5] 0.8581 0.9141 0.9423
13 U[0.25,0.75] 3 0.6628 0.7137 0.9550
14 U[0,1] 3 0.3979 0.4492 0.9506
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assessed by the total value of ‘effective’ attack opportunities 
that it has in a combat situation. Effective attack opportunity 
is determined by the number of resources and information 
acquisition.
We adopt a meta-matrix representation to model a combat 
environment, and create a graphical network model for a combat 
environment. A graphical model of a combat environment has 
heterogeneous nodes in different domains, and incorporates 
various interaction networks specified in a meta-matrix. This 
representation allows us to capture various aspects of a combat 
environment
Using a networked combat representation, two types 
of basic unit structures of attack opportunity – isolated and 
networked – are defined in an NCW environment. each of the 
two unit structure defines a network motif, and we measure 
their prevalence in a combat environment network to assess the 
total value of combat agents in terms of their effective attack 
opportunities. Experimental results verify that the proposed 
measure agrees with our expectation, and they are also in 
line with the previous findings in the context of attrition-
based models. The proposed measure sheds a light on further 
development of the measure as we extend it to incorporate 
more complicated combat environment. 
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